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Introduction 
During the last thirty years, public policies in developing and developed countries have been 
shaped by the implementation of economic liberalization processes. Liberalization started at 
the turning point of the eighties with policy measures of withdrawal of the State, privatisation 
of economic sectors and removal of trade barriers in order to increase international trade. The 
process took on specific characteristics according to the sectors considered and was 
implemented in different ways depending on the economic and political set up in each 
country. Starting in Europe with the telecom deregulation, these policies rapidly affected the 
rural and agricultural sectors in the developing world. Debates focus on the advantages or on 
the negative effects induced by these policies. Different tools and methods are used either to 
promote such process based on global equilibrium models (Aksoy, Beghin, 2005), or to point 
out the conditions that hinder the benefits that can be expected from such policies within the 
same intellectual framework (Boussard et al, 2004). At a macro level, writers like Audley et 
al. (2003) and Polaski (2006) emphasize the impact of growing inequalities on the economy 
and especially on the agricultural sector, e.g. in such a symbolic production sector for Mexico 
as maize (Nicita, 2004; Von Bertrab, 2005).  
In this era of economic and trade liberalization, producers’ organizations have gained new 
space for action and negotiation1, especially in countries where recent political freedom has 
made it possible for them to organize and express their voice in public debates (Mercoiret et 
al, 1997; Bosc et al. 2002). This has been the case mainly in countries where public life was 
under the tight control of ruling parties, especially in Africa and Asia. The case of Latin 
America is slightly different since producers’ organizations on the continent may show 
relatively different historical patterns of development. Some of these organizations rely on 
historical backgrounds and experiences gained throughout the 20th century, like in Uruguay, 
                                                 
1 Recently, World Development Report (World Bank, 2007) “Agriculture for development” has recognized the 
role of producers’ organizations. 
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in Chile or in Colombia. The long democratic history of these countries – even interrupted by 
authoritarian regimes – established the foundation for collective action through organizations. 
This is also the case in Costa Rica, where producers have built a system of representation 
historically based on commodity chains, and more specifically in the coffee and milk sectors 
which represent two major components of the country’s farming system2.  
Our contribution is to bring elements to understand the conditions under which such 
organizations can influence policy making and the sectors’ economy. We propose to study the 
period of liberalization of agriculture in Costa Rica as a major institutional change and to 
analyze the behaviors, achievements and outcomes of a selected sample of organizations. We 
consider as Producers’ Organizations (POs) membership organizations that bring together 
farmers and producers, but also herders, fishermen, landless and indigenous people who live 
in rural areas.  We also take producers in a broad sense adding to the scope of the definition 
the other actors that play a well defined role in the commodity chain: e.g. exporters, 
processors, etc. We will therefore consider as part of our study the organizations that 
correspond either to a specific type of actor (e.g.  all the export companies for coffee) or the 
organizations that correspond to producers and other stakeholders. They are based on free 
membership and structured well above the community level from regional to national and 
international levels. If they may adopt various organizational and institutional forms 
depending on the contexts, they clearly belong to private sector or to what Uphoff (1993) calls 
the “collective action sector”. But, they also contribute to the provision of public goods 
ranging from support systems including provision of services as capacity building, technical 
advices and information dissemination to producers up to public policy through negotiation in 
policy arenas. For analytical and exposure purposes, we will rely in the next sections on an 
                                                 
2 Even if their weight in the national economy has declined significantly in recent years, both coffee and milk 
sectors, with two distinct trajectories, shaped the political economy of the country (Rodriguez and Maître 
D’Hôtel, 2006). They remain key social and political sector closely linked to the social and economic history of 
the country (Melendez and Gonzalez, 1998 ; Peters and Samper, 2001, Edelman, 2005) 
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“ideal-type” distinction between “policy oriented organizations” and “market oriented 
organizations”, that has been adopted by scholars (De Janvry et al., 2004).     
We have chosen to analyze the role of Producers’ Organizations in four different farm-sectors 
in Costa Rica, highlighting their policy making and economic activities as two synergic 
dimensions. Within specific institutional environments inherited from their own history as 
organizations, we show that liberalization policies do not affect uniformly producers, 
depending on the capacity of their organizations to negotiate specific conditions or measures. 
More specifically, we demonstrate that far from being uniform, sector policies are deeply 
affected by interactions between private stakeholders and the public sector within the same 
global macro-economic setting.  We show that the magnitude of these interactions can lead to 
unexpected behaviors in view of the “standard” globalisation process as it is usually 
promoted. Either in deep-rooted farm-sectors or in new-born export ones, the ability of 
stakeholders to negotiate public support, even in the context of State withdrawal, remains a 
key objective. Our paper is divided in three main sections: the first one presents our 
theoretical and conceptual framework; the second one analyzes the policy-making activities of 
the organizations and a third one focuses on their economic dimension.  
1. Theoretical and conceptual framework   
We focus on the institutional and organizational dimensions of economic liberalization 
process. These two dimensions can be analyzed using Douglass North’s institutional change 
approach (North, 1990).  
1.1 Theoretical framework  
Institutional change is ruled by permanent interactions between institutions, broadly defined 
as “the rules of the game” and organizations, defined as “the players” (North, 1990). These 
interactions can be formalized by the existence of an “information / action loop” (Hodgson, 
1998), represented in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: The information / action loop (from Hodgson, 1998) 
 
 
 
We use this approach to explain differences that emerge between farm sectors within the same 
global institutional environment, which can be assimilated to national economic policy. In 
Costa Rica, the liberalization process mainly consisted in State withdrawal from agricultural 
markets regulation and in frontiers opening, and can be considered as a major institutional 
change for agricultural activities. In the literature, the issue is addressed mainly by empirical 
analysis of the way producers adapt to institutional changes by developing specific economic 
activities. For example, the analysis tend to focus on producers’ adaptation to trade 
liberalization (Ingco, 1995), to globalization (Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Ruben et al 2006), 
to specific economic reforms (McMillan et al, 1989; Lin, 1992) or to supermarkets 
development (Reardon et al, 2003; Dries et al, 2004). However, in developing countries3 little 
work has been done on the way producers can collectively shape in return institutional 
changes by leading policy-making activities (Borras et al, 2008; McKeon et al, 2004; Pesche, 
2006; World Bank, 2007). That is to say that, in most cases, institutional changes are 
considered as exogenous. In this paper, we analyze both organizations’ participation and 
adaptation to institutional changes, showing that organizations’ market-oriented and advocacy 
activities are interrelated and necessary to ensure an efficient market insertion for producers. 
Advocacy organizations, by participating to policy making activities and shaping specific 
policies, contribute to the definition of the economic environment under which market-
                                                 
3 The interplay between producers’ organisations and public sector negotiation formed the core of agricultural 
public policies in Europe through the different national based agricultural policies but also through the building 
of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). It has been a concern for scholars in sociology and politics for now 
more than half a century (see Fauvet et Mendras, 1958, Tavernier et al, 1972 et Collomb et al, 1990). For an 
analysis of the influence of these public policies on developing countries common agricultural policies see Balié 
and Fouilleux (2008).    
Institutions Organizations 
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oriented organizations will develop their activities. Interactions between organizations 
(advocacy and economical ones) and institutions (policies) are at the core of our analytical 
framework that is presented below. 
Figure 2: Analytical framework 
 
We analyze the whole set of activities developed by producers’ organizations, and we insist 
on advocacy activities as a means of enhancing market-oriented ones. The results of 
organizations are successively evaluated by:  
- The capacity of advocacy organizations to influence the elaboration of specific 
policies (in this case, organizations participate to institutional change and institutions 
are considered as endogenous). We evaluate the degree of influence of advocacy 
organizations on specific policies, this degree being relative to the participation of 
other organizations in policy making processes (see section II).  
- The capacity of economical organizations to ensure producers an efficient insertion on 
markets (in this case, organizations adapt to institutional change), following Berdegué 
intuitions on the performance of organizations (Berdegué, 2001). We evaluate the 
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efficiency of market oriented organizations in inserting producers on markets by 
calculating a ratio price paid by the organization regarding market price (see section 
III).  
Finally, we provide insights on the relationships between advocacy and market oriented 
organizations: doing so, we show that political and economical spheres are mutually 
connected.  
1.2 Methods and materials  
We carry out a comparative study of four farm sectors (coffee, milk, black bean and 
pineapple), based on a dynamic analysis of organizations’ behaviors regarding institutional 
change. The farm sectors have been selected according to two main criteria: the destination of 
products and an appreciation of the dynamics of production in volume (see Table 1). Coffee 
and pineapple are export products, while milk and bean are mostly destinated to domestic 
markets. Coffee is tightly linked to the socio-political history of the country whereas 
pineapple can be seen as a typical product of the export oriented agricultural policy since 
1984 (Agricultura de cambio). Black bean is part of the every day diet and was a widespread 
staple produced all over the country until recently. Milk represents a stable component of the 
farming systems backed by a strong co-operative system.   
Table 1 : Criteria of selection of the four farm sectors studied 
 Domestic market Export market 
Positive dynamics Milk Pineapple 
Negative dynamics Bean Coffee 
 
Partly, the farm sectors studied correspond to the typologies established by Poulton et al 
(2006) and Swinnen and Maertens (2007).  These four sectors also represent contrasted 
organizational and institutional environments which can only be understood with reference to 
their specific historical trajectories. 
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We directly collected the data in Costa Rica, between April 2004 and November 2006, mainly 
through the realization of qualitative interviews with representatives of producers’ 
organizations (21 organizations, 73 interviews), producers (160 interviews), representatives of 
public authorities (interviews) and private firms (10 interviews). The interviews were 
conducted at different levels, from the local level in the Huetar Norte Region to the national 
level in San Jose. We compared the information gathered with bibliographic sources and 
direct observations. In this paper we analyze the data collected by analytical descriptions 
techniques (Bates et al, 2000). 
1.3 Evolution of the four farm sectors studied  
Farm sectors are characterized by different trends that we describe in terms of number of 
producers, average producers’ market share and production volume, both for exports and 
imports. These characteristics are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2: Evolution of the farm sectors studied (extracted from National Coffee Institute and 
Ministry of Agriculture data and from Montero 2004, Salazar 2005) 
 Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple 
 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 
Producers’ number (1000) 89 59 9 5 21 6 0,6 3 
Producers’ market share (%) 50 35 90 95 100 25 10 20 
Production (1000 t) 1 701 1 439 590 610 26 11 546 1 964
Exports (1000 t) 1 531 1 295 - 57 - - 546 1 964
Imports (1000 t) - - - - - 23 - - 
 
Market conditions vary widely depending on the farm-sectors considered.  While in milk and 
pineapple sectors, expansion and dynamism seem to be the key words (volumes), in the bean 
and coffee sectors, crisis is on the agenda and the competitiveness of these sectors is 
threatened. Our point is that these differences may partly account for differences, between 
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farm sectors, in organizations’ policy and marker oriented activities. In the following sections, 
we demonstrate that producers’ organizations can play a key role in farm sector sustainability, 
through improving market access (either to domestic or export ones) and participation in 
policy-making. Despite a general trend towards wider liberalization, some sectors still benefit 
from important public support.  
2. The policy-making role of producers’ organizations  
Let us now consider the specific policies that apply to the different farm sectors. Situations 
differ widely: milk and coffee sectors still benefit from significant public support that protects 
them against liberalization (regulation of coffee prices, high milk tariffs) whereas the bean 
sector has been fully liberalized (State withdrawal, removal of trade barriers) and the 
pineapple one emerged as a symbol of the new policy.  For each farm sector:  
- We present the organizational landscape: we describe advocacy organizations’ 
behaviors. We qualify behaviors as pro-active when the organization directly lobbies 
within the right political space (where the final decision is taken) and defends its 
position on the basis of its own proposal, technically achieved. Using these broad 
types (pro-active versus defensive) is a means to analyze dominant behaviour 
regarding a specific time span and a reaction to a well defined institutional change; 
plus we show that organizations can move from one behaviour to another one through 
collective learning mechanisms (see below the case of bean sector).    
- We explain the differences in results obtained in term of organizations’ resources 
endowment. Each farm sector does have advocacy organizations that defend 
producers’ interests, with the exception of the pineapple sector where only large scale 
producers’ interests are defended.  These advocacy organizations are presented below. 
In the milk and coffee sectors, producers’ organizations always benefit from 
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participating in policy-making, which is hardly the case in the bean sector where the 
interests of industrials / importers tend to prevail during policy negotiations.   
Table 3: Overview of policy-making processes at stake in each one of the farm sectors  
 Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple 
Public support 
obtained 
High price regulation High market 
protection 
Low market protection Lobby at the 
EU 
Advocacy 
organizations 
 
 
3 organizations 
-Producers (Fenacafé) 
-Industrials (Canaca) 
-Exporters (Canaexca)
1 organization 
Canale 
17 organizations 
-Producers: one 
farmers’ union, 15 
market oriented 
organizations 
-Industrials (Caningra) 
1 
organization 
Canapep 
Coordination Strong Strong Low Strong 
PO’s behavior Pro-active Pro-active Defensive Pro-active 
PO’s results 
(influence degree) 
62% 100% 33% 100% 
(Legend: Fenacafe = National Federation of Coffee Cooperatives; Canaca = National 
Chamber of Coffee Growers; Canaexca = National Chamber of Coffee Exporters; Canale = 
National Chamber of Milk Producers and Industrials; Caningra = National Chamber of Grain 
Industrials; Canapep = National Chamber of Pineapple Producers and Exporters) 
 
2.1 Coffee sector 
In the coffee sector, the main policy challenge is to regulate national price in order to pre-
empt international coffee price fluctuations. Since the beginning of the 20th century, producers 
have benefited from such internal regulation, which protected them against international price 
variations (Diaz, 2003). Gaining public support has traditionally been governed by the 
constant interplay of three advocacy organizations: the National Federation of Coffee 
Cooperatives, the National Chamber of Coffee Growers and the National Chamber of Coffee 
Exporters that represents the interests of producers, firms and exporters (Chaves, 2000). The 
interplay takes place within the Coffee Institute (see Figure 3), set up in 1933. The policy 
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making process usually begins with a proposal from one of the three organizations (when the 
proposal is made by the producers’ organization, it is the result of a long consultation process 
with the members of cooperatives), followed by dialogue between the three organizations and 
the State (within the Coffee Institute), and ending with an internal decision, reached by a 
system of representative vote, and usually validated by the legislative power. 
Figure 3: The policy making process in coffee sector 
 
The final decision used to be a compromise between producers and others actors (growers and 
exporters), but since a few years, the Coffee Institute voting system has changed and 
producers have a higher influence (62%). One of the most important results of the interactions 
of the three advocacy organizations is the negotiation and creation in 1993 of a national coffee 
regulation fund aimed at weakening international prices fluctuations.  
2.2 Milk sector  
Milk sector in Costa Rica has always been regulated through prices control until 1999 and 
through an import limitation system that shifted from quotas to tariffs in 1995 (Montero, 
2004). These policies directly correspond to the actions of the National Chamber of Milk 
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Legislative Assembly
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Producers and Industrials, since its creation in 1962. The policy-making process usually starts 
with a proposal made by the Chamber that takes place after a consultation process with milk 
cooperatives and private firms, and is followed by negotiations with the executive power 
where the Chamber directly defends the proposal as a “sector position” (see Figure 4). 
Representatives from the Chamber have close relationships with representatives from 
Coopedospinos, a market-oriented organization that we will further present in section III. 
Figure 4: The policy making process in milk sector 
 
Nowadays, policy instruments at stake are import tariffs, directly negotiated between 
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and international trade experts from the 
National Chamber of Milk and from the CoopeDosPinos. Generally, the Chamber’s proposals 
are directly translated into policies (100% of influence): this influence tends to be enhanced 
by the economic weight of CoopeDosPinos and by the existence of personal ties between 
representatives of the executive power and those of CoopeDosPinos (Coopedospinos leaders 
did hold strategic positions in the government, such as Economics or Finance Ministers).   
Foreign Trade Ministry 
(import tariffs)
National Chamber of Milk 
Producers and Industrials
Coopedospinos
Coop Coop
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Economics Ministry 
(standards, prices)
Cooperatives (market oriented FO)
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2.3 Bean sector 
In the bean sector, from the producers’ point of view, the main policy stake is to protect 
domestic production from imports, negotiating high tariff levels. The policy-making process 
is shaped by interactions between a myriad of producers’ organizations, the industrials 
organization (National Chamber of Grain Industrials, mostly importers) and the State (as 
represented on Figure 5). 
Figure 5: The policy making process in bean sector 
 
Producers are represented by a producers’ union that generally protests against State 
withdrawal from direct production support (without specifically defending bean producers’ 
interests) and an average of 15 locally-based market-oriented organizations that are not 
specialized in advocacy activities and fail to coordinate their activities. On the other hand, 
industrials are represented by a professional organization that has quite good capacities to 
design appropriate policy proposals (high-level knowledge in international trade issues, good 
technical skills to analyze economic situations and to formulate policy proposals), and gain 
public support to lower import tariffs. At the beginning of the process, in 1995, there was no 
StateCaningra 
Bean National Commission
FOFOFO
FOFO FOPeasant union
Foreign Trade Ministry
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platform for dialogue between these organizations, and the government tended to attend 
industrials’ interests at a 100%. Nowadays, the process is ruled by the existence of the Bean 
National Commission (set up in 2003), that functions as a consultation forum and permits the 
producers to better defend their positions (influence of 33%). Discussions lead to internal 
decisions; however, the final policy decision often differs significantly from this internal 
decision.  Indeed, the final decision on tariff is taken by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and is 
generally the result of a negotiation process in which Caningra directly participates, and not 
producers’ organizations.  
2.4 Pineapple sector 
The situation in the pineapple sector is quite different: it symbolizes the “other side4” of the 
agricultural policies implemented at the time of Structural Adjustment Programs. Such 
policies were known as “agricultura de cambio” and were mostly oriented towards 
diversification for export markets. Their implementation led to a combination of free-market 
orientation (with multinationals in the lead) and public support, mainly through export 
subsidies targeted to the multinationals and the provision of regional public goods (mainly 
infrastructures). Strong opposition to these subsidies by farmers’ unions led to their 
withdrawal in 1999. Today, public support consists in extending locally programs for small 
holders to cope with standards requirements (Veerabadren, 2004) and the policy-making 
process is targeted towards the international level (e.g. trade negotiations with the European 
Union). The process is headed by a single organization, the National Chamber of Pineapple 
Producers and Exporters (Canapep), created in 2003, that represents the interests of large-
scale producers and exporters.  The interests of small-scale producers are not represented. 
Figure 6 gives an illustration of the importance of the Canapep relationships network.  
 
                                                 
4 Compared to the policy shift experienced in the bean sector.  
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Figure 6: The policy making process in pineapple sector 
 
Basically, Canapep’s activities target the European Union and the United States, and consist 
in lobbying for an elimination of tariff barriers, to sustain the Costa Rican pineapple market.  
To achieve this goal, the Chamber focuses on gaining political support at national level in 
order to influence international trade negotiations.  High ranking public stakeholders are 
enrolled in the process, including the President of the Republic, experts and officials in the 
Ministries of Foreign Trade and External Relations, members of Parliament, ambassadors and 
delegates from the EU and the USA in Costa Rica.    
2.5 Synthesis 
In each of the cases, the policy-making process involves a series of proposals and decisions.  
In three of the cases studied, the final decision negotiated with the executive or legislative 
body corresponds to a high extend to the proposal secured through advocacy organizations. In 
the bean sector however, there is a discrepancy between the final decision (negotiation of a 
low import tariff that serves the interests of industrials) and the one reached in the 
Commission (compromise on a fluctuant and medium import tariff that serves both the 
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interests of industrials and producers). These differences of degree of influence can be 
explained by organization’s resources, as illustrated in Table 4.  
Table 4: Correspondence between advocacy organizations’ results and resources  
PO resources endowment  PO degree of 
influence Technical abilities Financial capacities Human capital Trajectory 
Coffee 62% Very high High Very high 70 years 
Milk 100% Very high Very high Very high 40 years 
Bean 33% Low Very low Low 10 years 
Pineapple 100% Very high Very high Very high 5 years 
 
3. The economical role of producers’ organizations  
To assess organizations’ market oriented activities, we use Williamson’s governance structure 
concept to describe the mechanisms prevailing in each one of the farm-sectors: this includes 
markets, hierarchies and hybrid forms (Williamson, 1996). We use these broad categories to 
synthetically describe the differences between the sectors. We do not aim at using them as an 
analytical tool since we do not intend to explore the types of governance. Thus, we have 
characterized the currently prevailing governance structures and described more precisely the 
role producers’ organization play. A first observation (Table 5) leads us to the statement that 
the governance structures prevailing differ greatly from one farm sector to the other, and that 
in each one of the farm sectors, producers’ organizations do play a role in the coordination of 
economic activities, but this role vary a lot according to considered farm sector  
Table 5: Governance structures in the farm sectors studied 
 Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple 
Main governance structure Hybrid Hierarchy Market Hierarchy 
Other governance structure Hierarchy Hybrid Hybrid Market, hybrid 
Producers’ organizations’ market 
share 
35 % 95 % 10 % 15 % 
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3.1 Coffee sector 
Coffee is one of the oldest agricultural commodities in Costa Rica. Production is sustained by 
a broad base of small-scale producers that historically play an important role in the 
construction of the democratic Costa Rican State (Peters and Samper, 2001). Coffee sector is 
characterized by a relatively low level of integration: indeed, since its inception, coffee 
production has mainly been the preserve of small-scale producers selling cherries to 
beneficiadores scattered in the central valley (Sfez, 2001). This initial low level of integration 
partially accounts for the current governance structure, represented in Figure 7. Economic 
activities are mainly managed by hybrid structures, that rely on the existence of contracts 
between producers and cooperatives (or private firms), and between cooperatives (or private 
firms) and exporters working with foreign importers in consumer countries. 
Figure 7: Economic structure of the coffee sector 
 
In the 1990s, coffee prices have been declining, despite the existence in Costa Rica of a 
national regulation system (Diaz, 2003). Since this crisis, cooperatives that mostly emerged in 
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the 1930s and consolidated in the 1960s are slightly loosing market shares after a deep 
management crisis that necessitated their profound restructuring during the 1990s. On the 
other hand, private firms, which tend to integrate functions vertically, giving raise to 
hierarchical structures, are gaining importance. However, some cooperatives are evolving in 
emerging niche markets and directing themselves towards newly formed quality markets, 
complying with market demand standards. Evolve in emerging niche markets These 
cooperatives tend to integrate production and export functions, through (i) the implementation 
of tighter contractual arrangements with their members and (ii) the creation of consortiums (as 
for example the Coocafe initiative that represent more than 3500 producers and nine 
cooperatives certified “Fair trade coffee”).   
3.2 Milk sector 
Milk production in Costa Rica is carried out by a limited number of producers who tend to 
increase their acreage and to specialize: recent developments are marked by significant 
productivity gains (SEPSA, 2002). Hierarchy is the most important governance structure, and 
corresponds to a powerful organization called Coopedospinos, that emerged in the 1950s and 
progressively vertically integrated the entire milk sector, from production inputs to the 
distribution of processed goods to consumers (Melendez and Gonzalez, 1998). 
Coopedospinos producers tend to have larger farms than others, who supply smaller 
cooperatives or private firms, trough contractual arrangements (see Figure 8). Small holders 
producers can hardly integrate Coopedospinos because the organization evolved towards a 
closed membership system and is close to the new generation cooperatives described in North 
America (Cook and Illiopoulos, 1999). With only 1,380 producers (27% of the milk producers 
in Costa Rica), the organization practically has monopoly over the domestic milk market. 
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Figure 8 Economic structure of the milk sector 
 
This position would not have been possible without the existence of a system of high import 
tariffs that totally protect the domestic milk market and has been presented in section II as a 
result of advocacy organizations’ participation to policies making processes. In the last ten 
years, Coopedospinos has strengthened its economic weight, and developed exports towards 
North and Central American markets (a 10% of its production is exported).  
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disappearance or reorientation of many small-scale producers (Salazar, 2005). Currently, in 
the bean sector, economic transactions are essentially market-oriented, and more than 75% of 
the bean consumed in Costa Rica is imported by private firms encouraged by a low import 
tariff (we saw in section II that the low efficiency of organizations that participate to policy 
negociations is in direct link with this low tariff). The bean produced in Costa Rica itself is 
marketed without any kind of vertical structure or contract. Recently structured producers’ 
organizations are trying to establish contracts with private firms and with producers (see 
Figure 9), but business is tough since producers are not used to such contracts and tend to sell 
their production to intermediaries as they show off, breaching the established contracts 
between organizations and distribution firms. 
Figure 9: Economic structure of the bean sector 
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3.4 Pineapple sector  
Pineapple is quite recent in Costa Rica as a significant export crop: its production for export 
rose dramatically since the end of the nineties. Such recent and rapid development is related 
to the setting up of multinationals in the mid-1980s and early 1990s (Quesada, 1999), 
supported by important public programs (that ended in 1999). In the last ten years, this trend 
was followed by the re-orientation of many producers towards pineapple production 
(Veerabadren, 2004). In the 1990s, multinational firms extended their packaging and export 
functions to include production activities, thus vertically integrating the entire sector. Today, 
these private hierarchical forms are reflected in the governance structure. However, they are 
slightly loosing relative economic weight (and indeed their position of quasi “unique” actors), 
due to: (i) the recent emergence of producers’ organizations that give rise to hybrid structures 
(or even to hierarchical structures), and (ii) the dynamism of the market that makes contract 
enforcement a hard task for the firms confronted to the free riding of producers.  
Figure 10: Economic structure of the pineapple sector 
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3.5 Synthesis 
Producers’ organizations are of special importance in the coordination of economic activities, 
but their control on market differs from one farm sector to the other, ranging from a 10% of 
market share in the bean sector to a 95% of market share in the milk sector. Such level of 
importance has evolved over time, revealing different adaptive capacities to cope with (i) risk 
and vulnerability issues, and (ii) new standards compliance requirements, mostly, but not 
exclusively, in international markets.  
- Milk is a fresh and perishable product that needs tight management to avoid health 
hazards: dairy cooperatives nowadays largely comply with safety standards. 
Coopedospinos succeeds in maintaining its monopolistic position, leaving very little 
room to smaller cooperatives and private firms. In this situation, small holders tend to 
be excluded from the sector. 
- Just as milk, pineapple is a fresh and perishable product, and besides, its production 
must comply with European and US quality standards for fresh goods (Faure and 
Samper, 2006). New-born producers’ organizations are gradually strengthening their 
economic position, challenging multinational companies, thus revealing strong 
adaptive capacities.  
- Coffee sector must also cope with new quality standards through product 
differentiation strategies. If cooperatives are relatively loosing importance in 
comparison with private firms and have difficulties to adapt to the international 
context, the cooperatives that evolve towards emerging niche markets and comply 
with new standards (organic, origin-based, fair trade coffees) can be a good option for 
small holders to maintain themselves in the activity.  
- In the bean sector, recently created market-oriented organizations are experiencing 
hard times because the liberalization implemented means increased imports. This 
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situations has to do with the poor degree of policy influence of organizations in the 
bean sector, that fail to negotiate a high tariff that would fully protect bean producers 
from imports.  
In milk, pineapple and coffee sector, hierarchy, though not exclusively, shapes governance 
structures. To some extent, hierarchies correspond to the existence of dominant stakeholders, 
as the Coopedospinos in milk sector, national firms or cooperatives in coffee sector, and 
multinational companies in pineapple sector. In this cases, there is a positive relation between 
the governance structure (hierarchy or captive contracting) and the capacity of organizations 
to adapt and in return shape institutional changes. In bean case, there is a negative relation 
between the governance structure (market or modular contracting) and the capacity of 
organizations to adapt and influence institutional changes.  
Conclusion 
We underlined the importance of the institutional and organizational linkages between so 
called “policy oriented” organizations and “market oriented” ones. Producers’ organizations 
play a key role in the regulation of farm-sectors, particularly in facilitating both participation 
in policy-making processes and producers’ domestic and international market insertion. But 
their political and economic weight differs considerably among the sectors. Some 
organizations experience relative institutional continuity (milk and coffee sectors) and are part 
of a thick institutional system that brings together stakeholders sharing a minimum of 
common interests around the sector. They rely on it to build new arrangements. More recent5 
organizations (pineapple sector) present a high degree of influence linked to the convergence 
with the liberalization process. Others experience institutional shocks (bean sector) and 
engage a learning process to participate in policy-making processes. Our analysis, based on 
empirical evidence, reveals that there is an interrelation between the intensity of the economic 
                                                 
5 Considering only the organization per se, appreciation may be different given that individuals may possess 
deep experience acquired in other organizations 
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coordination and the influence on the policy-making process. A stakeholder’s dominant 
economic position in the value chain (pineapple or milk) corresponding to hierarchical 
coordination is associated with a strong influence on policy-making. We may extend this to 
the coffee sector to a lesser extent due to lower concentration of economic power, which in 
turn is compensated by stronger and historical ties between sector professionals and policy 
makers. 
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